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Abstract
The collective  approach to household behavior  relaxes  The authors present Nepalese  evidence  that suggests that
the restrictive  features of the unitary model by specifying  a woman's share of household  earnings  understates  her
household welfare as a weighted combination  of the  "power"  in  making household  decisions.  An  increase  in
individuals'  utilities.  But the weights are assumed  fixed  the woman's educational experience  leads to a rise in her
or exogenous  to the analysis.  Koolwal and Ray  extend  bargaining  power.  The results also reveal  some
the collective  approach  by proposing and estimating a  interesting  nonmonotonic  relationships between  a
framework where  the weights are determined  and  woman's "power"  and the household's  expenditure
simultaneously  estimated with the household outcomes.  outcomes.
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Empirical  analysis  of household  expenditure  has,  traditionally,  been  based  on the  unitary
model  that  assumes  that  family  members  maximise  a  single  utility  function.  The  assumption of
common  preference  ordering  among  family  members  can  be  traced  to  Samuelson  (1956)  and
Becker  (1981).  The  unitary  model  has  been  increasingly  challenged  in  recent  years  through
attempts  at modelling  individual utility to  incorporate the  divergent  and conflicting preferences  of
different  family  members.  Examples  include  the  cooperative  bargaining  models  [Manser  and
Brown  (1980),  McElroy  and  Homey  (1981),  Moehling  (1995)],  the non  cooperative  bargaining
models [Kanbur and Haddad (1994), Lundberg and Pollak (1994)], and the "sharing rule" approach
based on a Pareto  efficient sharing role between household members  [Chiappori  (1988), Browning
and  Chiappori  (1998)].  Crucial  to  the  non unitary  models  is  the  relative  "power"  of individual
members in the household  [see Pollak (1994)].
As Basu (2001a)  has recently  pointed  out,  a distinctive,  perhaps  limiting, characteristic  of
the literature on non unitary models is that the welfare weights assigned to the individual household
members  are fixed and exogenous to household decision making.  To our knowledge,  Basu (2001 a)
is the first attempt at endogenising the welfare weight'  in a model of intra household behaviour.  The
present study extends Basu (2001 a)  in several  ways: (i) Basu's framework is generalised to allow a
simple test of his assumption that the female's share of adult wage earnings is a correct measure  of
her  bargaining  power,  (ii)  the  woman's  welfare  weight  is  allowed  to  depend  on  the  relative
educational  experience  of the woman vis a vis the man, (iii) empirical  evidence is presented  on the
endogenously  determined welfare  weight, on its variation with female  education, and on its impact
on  household  expenditure  patterns2.  The  results  are  particularly  significant  since
' See,  also,  Pollak  (1994)  for  a  similar  argument.  In  this  paper,  we treat the  terms  "welfare  weight"  and "power"
synonymously.
2See Moehling (1995)  for evidence  on the impact of the child's work status, used as a proxy for her bargaining power,
on the distribution of household resources.there exists little empirical evidence  on household behaviour in an intra household model where the
welfare  weights  are  endogenously  determined  and  simultaneously  estimated  with  the  other
behavioural  parameters.  The  significance  of  the  impact  of  female  "power"  on  expenditure
allocation,  conditional  on  all  other  household  characteristics  including  aggregate  household
expenditure  remaining constant,  constitutes  a test of the income pooling hypothesis underlying the
unitary model  [see Maitra and Ray (2000) for an alternative test].
The  plan  of this  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  model  and  describes  the
estimation.  The  results  are  presented  and  discussed  in  Section  3.  The  paper  concludes  with
Section 4.
2.  The Intra Household Model with Endogenous Welfare Weights
Let  us  consider  a  household  with  a  woman,  man  and  a  child.  We  shall  denote  these
individuals  as  1, 2,  3 respectively.  Following  the  "collective  approach",  the  household  welfare
function is:
W  =  0(z)u  (x)  + (1 - O(Z))U2 (x)  (1)
where ul  and u2 denote, respectively, the individual utilities of the woman and the man, specified as
a function of goods and leisure, x.  The balance  of power in the household,  0 s  [0,  1],  is dependent
on a set of household  characteristics,  z.  As 0  increases,  the  'power'  of the woman  increases,  and
vice  versa.  The "collective  approach"  either considers  0 to be fixed, or specifies the  z variables to
be exogenous  to the analysis so that 0 is also exogrenous.  The unitary model imposes the restriction
of common preferences on (1), i.e.,  u, (x) = u2 (x) = u(x).
Following Basu  (2001a,  Section  2),  we endogenise  0 by allowing  the  z vector to  include
choice variables that are also contained in x. To simplify the exposition, let us specify the individual
utilities to be functions  of leisure hours, i.e. 1l,  12,  13  which are, respectively,  the leisure hours of the
2man,  woman  and  the  child.  The  individual  utilities  are  specified  as  u(,,13),u2 (122,13).  The
assumption made  here  is that,  while  the woman  and the  man do not care for each other's leisure,
they both care for the "leisure" of their child (13) which includes time spent on her/his schooling.
The household's welfare maximisation problem can, therefore, be written as:
MAX  O(Z)U 1 (1,1 3 )+(1-O(Z))u 2 (12,1 3 )  (2)
(w.r.t.  1 1,1 2,1 3)
subjectto  w,l, +w2 12 +w3 13 +i<￿Y  (3)
where wl, w2, w3 are the market wage rates of men, women and children (considered  exogenous  in
this  analysis),  x  is  aggregate  household  expenditure  and Y  is unearned  income. If we recognise
leisure hours as,  simply, the negative of labour hours (namely, el,  e2,  e3)3, then the welfare function
can be re-expressed as:
O(z)ul(e,,e 3)+  (1-  (z))u2 (e 2,e3 )  (4)
Note that the utilities are decreasing in labour hours.
We specify the female power variable as follows:
O(z 1, z 2, edI,ed2 )=  (I  +Z  (5)
with '  =  '  +  C  ed,  (5a)
where  zi = wi ei is adult earnings  (i =  1, 2) and ed1, ed2 denote, respectively,  the years of schooling
of the most educated adult female and male members of the  household.  Eqn (5)  allows,  via + < 1,
for  the  female's  share  of adult  earnings  to  be  an  understatement  of  her  true  "power"  in  the
household,  and for an overstatement if + > 1. Eqn (5a) allows, via  1, the female power parameter,
*,  to  depend  on the relative  educational  experiences  of the woman  and the man.  Note,  therefore,
3 Since the focus of this paper is on the adult welfare weights, child labour (e3) enters the analysis quite tangentially via
the  adult utilities, ul, u2. For more  complex  models  of child labour,  see Basu and  Van  (1998), Ray (2000)  and Basu
(2001b).that a test of Oo = 1, ¢  = 0 constitutes a test of Basu (2001a)'s assumption that the female's share of
adult earnings is a correct measure of her bargaining power.
Let us choose the following simple functional forms for ul, u2:
u, (e, ,e3)=e  -PIe-P3  (6a)
PI>0 ,  P3>0
u2(e2,e 3 ) = e 2 e3 PeP3  (6b)
P2>0,  p3>0
After  routine  manipulation,  the  welfare  maximisation  exercise  yields  the  following  estimable
female and male earnings equations, expressed  as a share of total household earnings,
E = (w1e1 + w2e2+ w3e3):
w1e_  e1 {pOe-PI-1  -0  1 (e'PI  - e-P2 )} E( 1 + 3 es  +p  pX~~2  (7a)
E  (PI + P30el P' -F  (P2  + P3 Xl - 0)2-P2
W2e2  (1-0)p2e-P'  -0 2e2(elP'  -ePI  )
(PI  + P3e  + (P2 + P3 X1 - 0)P2b
where  0°  =-> °,  02  =-<0  denote  the responsiveness  of the  female's  bargaining  power  to
ael  ,  e2
female and male  labour hours,  respectively.  In conventional  treatments of the "collective"  model,
01 =02=0.
The  empirical  exercise  employs  a two  stage  estimation  procedure.  In  the  first  stage,  we
estimate the  female power function parameters  (4'o,  1,), along with utility  function parameters  (pi,
P2)  by  applying nonlinear  SUR on equations  (7a, 7b).  Using the estimated values of +o and +1, we
then generate via eqns.  (5,  5a) the female power variable,  0. The second stage  involves estimating,
using 3SLS,  the following  set of simultaneous  equations  - the  (N - 1) independent budget share
equations  (bsi, N being the number of items), the total per capita expenditure (tpc) equation, and the
Lj.female power (0) equation,  with bsi  (i =  1,..., N-1), tpc  and 0 being treated as jointly endogenous.
Note  in particular that we have  allowed for the dependence  of the "female  power" variable,  0, on,
among  others, the household's  aggregate expenditure  variable, tpc.  Note also the joint and mutual
dependence  of commodity demand (bsi), aggregate expenditure  (tpc) and female power (0), via
(8a) - (8c) in the empirical exercise.
bs;  = fi (wI,W2,W 3, tpc, tpC2,0,02, n)  (8a)
i= 1,...N-1
tpc=fN(wI,w 2 ,5w 3, 0,02,d,r,n)  (8b)
0 = fN+l  (w,I  w 2w3, tpc, d, r, ed,, ed2, n)  (8c)
where n denotes the vector of household compositional variables, and d, r denote the characteristics
of the household's  region of residence.  To simplify  estimation,  we  assume linear functional  forms
in eqns. (8a) - (8c).
3.  Data and Results
The data on child labour comes from the Nepal Living Standards  Survey (NLSS) conducted
in June,  1995  by the Household  Survey Unit of the  Central Bureau  of Statistics (CBS).  The main
objective of the NLSS is to collect data from Nepalese  households  and provide  information  to the
government  to monitor progress  in national  living standards and to evaluate  the impact of various
policies and programs on the  living conditions of the population.  The sample  size for the NLSS  is
3388  households.  Further, this sample  is divided into four strata based on the geographic  regions of
the  country:  mountains,  urban  hills,  rural  hills  and  terai.  This  study  uses  the  following  7-item
breakdown  of total  consumer  expenditure:  Tobacco,  Food,  Fuel,  Housing,  Education,  Consumer
Durables and Clothing.
5Table  1 presents the results of estimating equations  (7a,  7b). With the exception of p3,  all of
the other parameter  estimates are well determined  and highly  significant. The  Pi,  P2 estimates  show
that the magnitude of the negative impact of male labour hours on his utility (P2)  is higher than that
of female labour hours on her utility or welfare  (pi).  The estimates of 4o, 4) convincingly  reject the
joint hypothesis:  4o  = 1, 4) = 0 ie., that the wage earnings  distribution between the woman  and the
man is an accurate  measure  of their bargaining  power.  The  4o  estimate of 0.889 suggests that the
woman's share of adult wage earnings is an understatement of her true bargaining power, while the
41  estimate  shows  that  the  magnitude  of this  understatement  increases  with  an  increase  in the
woman's educational experience vis a vis that of the man.
Table 2 reports the  results of the 3SLS estimates of the equation  system (8a) - (8c).  The 4
parameter  estimates  used  in the  3SLS  estimation,  reported  in Table  2,  assumes  41  =  0  (see  eqn.
(5a)).  The qualitative  results  are robust to the relaxation of this assumption (see footnote of Figure
1). The endogeneity of the female bargaining power variable, 0, is underlined by the significance  of
most  of the  household  characteristics  in  the  estimated  equation  (8c).  Six  features  stand  out,  in
particular:  (i)  the  female's  bargaining  power  (0)  is  significantly  and  positively  affected  by  the
woman's wage rate  and negatively by the man's; (ii) the child wage rate has little impact on 0; (iii)
women in the rural  areas of Nepal have,  ceteris paribus,  higher bargaining power than their urban
counterpart;  (iv) the female's bargaining power is highly sensitive to household composition - that
is, ceteris paribus, females enjoy greater power in households  with more women and older children
but less power in households  with more men and younger children; (v) a ceteris paribus  increase in
the female's educational  experience  leads  to a significant  increase  in her bargaining  power inside
the household;  and  (vi)  a  similar  increase  in  the  male's  educational  experience  has  an opposite
effect.
6Of the other results in Table  2, the ones of particular  interest relate  to the impact of female
power  (0)  on  the  budget  shares  of the  7  items,  and  on  the  household's  per  capita  aggregate
expenditure. With the exception of consumer durables, all of the other budget share equations  reject
the principal  testable  implication of the unitary model,  namely, that the 0, 02 variables  are jointly
insignificant  in their  impact on the  individual  budget  shares.  While  0 is  significant  for aggregate
household  expenditure,  the  02  term  is  not  significant.  The results  also  show that  the relationship
between budget share  (bs,) and the female's bargaining  power (0),  while mostly non-linear,  varies
greatly  between  items.  This  is  brought  out  clearly  in  Figure  1. Tobacco,  for  example,  is  an
interesting  example  of a "private  good" which  is consumed  (almost exclusively)  by the adult male
in the household. As female power increases,  the share of tobacco falls continuously until it reaches
a minimum  (o =  0.7)  when it starts to rise again.
The  sensitivity  of the  relation  between  the budget  share  and  female  power  is seen  more
clearly in Figure 2, which involves a finer (14-good) disaggregation of the food items in a 3SLS re-
estimation  of equations  (8a  - 8c).  The 3SLS  estimates  are available  on request.  These  show  [see
footnote  of  Figure  2]  that  eggs  and  milk,  cooking  oil,  and  sweets  (both  of which  are  jointly
consumed inside the household) do not reject the constancy of budget share with respect to 0 and 02
which the unitary model implies.  Baby milk, which,  like tobacco,  has the features of a private good
in  that  it  is  consumed  exclusively  by  a  child  member,  exhibits  significantly  non-monotonic
relationships with respect to  0.  Generally,  items which have features of a "public good" in that they
are consumed by all members  (i.e.,  flour and rice,  eggs  and milk,  and meat) tend  to show greater
monotonicity  than other  "privately  consumed"  items  (i.e.,  baby  milk,  alcohol,  and tobacco).  The
graphs  presented  in  Figures  1 and  2  do not  provide  much  support to the  picture  of a horizontal
straight  line  that  is  implied  by  the  unitary  model.  The  idea  of income  pooling,  underlying  the
traditional  unitary  model,  with  the  female  weights  or  bargaining  power  having  no  impact  on
7expenditure  pattern,  has only limited support,  mainly from items (eg.,  consumer durables in Table
2) which are jointly consumecl  inside the householi.
4.  Summary and Conclulsions
In the unitary model, the identity of the income recipient within the household  is irrelevant
in traditional  analysis  of household  expenditure.  Also,  an unequal balance  of power between men
and  women  in  making  household  decisions  has  little  consequence  for  household  outcomes.
Consequently, the "power" of individuals in making decisions has attracted little attention in studies
of household  behaviour.  The  "collective  approach"  departs  from  these  restrictive  features  by
expressing  household  welfare  as a weighted  sum of individual  utilities.  However,  the  weights  are
considered  to be fixed or exogenous to the analysis.  One therefore overlooks the possibility that the
weights could be altered by the outcomes themselves.
This paper extends  the collective approach by proposing and estimating a framework where
the weights  are  endogenised  and simultaneously  determined with the household's  expenditure  and
earnings  decisions.  Defining a female's  "power"  as her endogenously determined  welfare  weight,
the study finds on Nepalese data that the woman's share of household earnings  understates her true
"power"  in  influencing  household  outcomes.  Other interesting  results  include:  (a)  ceteris paribus,
the  rural  woman  enjoys  greater  power  within  the  household  than her urban  counterpart,  and  (b)
education  plays  an  effective  role  in  enhancing  the  power of women  inside  the household.  The
estimates  of  the  "female  power"  equation  provide  considerable  support  to  Basu  (2001a)'s
suggestion  that  the  welfare  weights  should  be  estimated  simultaneously  with  the  household
outcomes.
The statistical  significance  or otherwise of the impact of female power on an item's budget
share  provides a  convenient  test  of the  income pooling  hypothesis  underlying  the unitary  model.
The results provide little evidence in support of income pooling, especially for items which have the
8characteristics  of a "private  good" in being primarily consumed  by particular household  members.
Note,  however,  that limited  support for  income pooling does  exist  for items that are  collectively
consumed  inside  the household.  The  results  reveal  some  interesting  non-monotonic  relationships
between "female power" and budget share that vary a good deal between items.
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P3  -5.1 le-8
(5.15e-6)
a  Standard Errors in BracketsTable 2: 3SLS Estimates of Simultaneous  Equationsa [Eqns. (8a) - (8c)]
Coefficient Estimateb
Variable
Tobacco  Food  Fuel  Housing  Education  Durables  Clothing
Female  Wage  Rate  2.37e-4  -0.002  1.33e-4  0.002  -4.3 1e-4  6.23e-5  5.66e-4
(4.47e-5)  (2.30e-4)  (2.24e-5)  (1.74e-4)  (9.57e-5)  (7.19e-5)  (1.36e-4)
-1.32e-5  5.89e-4  -5.07e-5  -4.81e-4  7.46e-5  -7.17e-5  -4.6e-5
Male  Wage Rate  (1.38e-5)  (7.66e-5)  (7.05e-6)  (5.85e-5)  (2.99e-5)  (2.17e-5)  (4.2e-5)
Child Wage  Rate  -5.73e-5  3.82e-4  -2.04e-5  -5.27e-5  -1.73e-4  1.09e-4  -1.87e-4
(3.35e-5)  (1.84e-4)  (1.7e-5)  (1.4 1e-4)  (7.23e-5)  (5.27e-5)  (1.02e-4)
No. of Women  8.12e-4  -0.026  0.002  0.023  -0.004  0.005  -0.001
(7.1 Oe-4)  (0.004)  (3.61 e-4)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)
No. of Men  -0.004  0.030  -0.003  -0.021  0.009  0.003  -0.013
(8.48e-4)  (0.005)  (4.28e-4)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)
J  36e-5 uo 111  3.7e-5  0.002  0.0 15  -0.002  -0.004 No. of Children (aged  10- 15 years)  ).36e-5  -0.011.e5  .0  .05-.02-.0
(6.98e-4)  (0.004)  (3.56e-4)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)
-0.002  -0.004  1.39e-4  0.003  0.005  0.004  -0.006
No. of Children (aged  less than 10 years)  (3.88e-4)  (0.002)  (1.97e-4)  (0.002)  (8.38e-4)  (6.14e-4)  (0.001)
Total Per Capita Consumption  -2.39e-6  -1.61e-5  3.98e-7  9.2 1e-6  9.56e-6  6.60e-6  -7.23e-6
(3.65e-7)  (1.80e-6)  (1.8le-7)  (1  .36e-6)  (7.79e-7)  (5.96e-7)  (I. 12e-6)
(Total Per capita Consumption) 2 1  .46e-1 1  1.06e-10  -5.2 le-12  -5.13e- I  -6.97e-1 1  -3.73e-11  4.3 le-l 1
(2.77e-12)  (1.36e-I1)  (1.37e-12)  (1.02e-11)  (5.91e-12)  4.53e-12  (8.48e-12)
Female Power  -0.132  1.361  -0.086  -1.111  0.321  -0.016  -0.338
(0.032)  (0.167)  (0.016)  (0.126)  (0.070)  (0.052)  (0.099)
(Female Power) 2 0.092  -0.939  0.057  0.780  -0.238  -0.002  0.250
(0.027)  (0.138)  (0.013)  (0.105)  (0.058)  (0.043)  (0.082)
Constant  0.069  0.537  0.036  0.279  -0.126  -0.036  0.24
(0.009)  (0.043)  (0.004)  (0.033)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.026)
12Table 2: (Continued)
Per Capita Consumption (tpc)  Female Power (0)
Coefficient  Coefficient
Variable  Estimateb  ariable  Estimateb
Female Wage Rate  576.62  Female  Wage Rate  0.003
Male Wage  Rate  -157.57  Male  Wage Rate  (6.i4e-5)
-36.90)  -2.714e-4
Child Wage Rate  (49.52)  Child Wage Rate  (2. 16e-4)
No. of Women  7299.98  No. of Women  (0.047)
No.  of  Men  ~~~-8536.68  No  fMn-0.053 No. of Men  (2868.99)  No. of Men  (0.004)
No. of Children (aged  10 - 15 years)  (1223.36)  No.  of Children (aged  10 - 15  years)  (0.005)
No. of Children (aged less than  10  -691.09  No. of Children (aged less than 10  -0.007
years)  (867.35)  years)  (0.002)
DR'  (Development Region)  -2911.86  DRC  (Development Region)  (0.005)
(959.08)  005
RURURB  (I = rural, 0 = urban)  (13333.37)  RURURB (I  = rural, 0 = urban)  (0.015)
Female Power  -285274.6  Total Per Capita Consumption  (5.30e-7)
(Female  Power)2 163658  edl (Years of Schooling of Most  0.004
(Female Power)2  (126122.3)  Educated Female Member)  (0.001)
67630.67  ed2 (Years of Schooling of Most  -0.006
Constant  (19005.46)  Educated Male Member)  (0.001)
Constant  ~~~~~~~~0.3  14 Constant  (0.019)
' The Breusch Pagan test yields  2  = 2277.954, thus confirming the simultaneity of the nine equations.
b  Standard errors  in parentheses
c DR = I for Eastern Nepal, 2 for Central Western,  3 for Mid Western/Far Western Nepal as the region of residence
of the household.
13Figure 1. Relationship Between  Household  ]Expenditure Shares and Female Power (0)1
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'Constant  factors  of 0.05  and 40,000  were  added to the  education  expenditure  share  function  and the  total consumption  per capita
functions,  respectively, to  ensure nonnegative  values at each level of female  power. While  results from the basic 3SLS  model for 0
(where + is not dependent on anything) were used to produce the  graphs, essentially the same graphs  would have resulted from using
the extended  3SLS model for 0 (where  + = (+0  + +1  (maxfemed/maxmaled))  since the output for both models was almost exactly the
same. All figures were calculated at the mean values for all of the other variables  in each equation.  Results for consumer durables with
respect to 0 and 02 were not significant, and the coefficient for 02 in the total consumption per capita function was not significant.
14Figure 2. Relationship Between Household Food Expenditure Shares and Female Power (0)1
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'Food  expenditure  shares were  calculated as the share of purchased  value of these goods relative to total food expenditure.  Constant factors of 0.05
and 0.02  were added to the  functions for baby  milk and  alcohol,  respectively,  in order to ensure nonnegative  expenditure  share  values. All figures
were  calculated  at  the mean  values  for  all of the other  variables  in  each  equation.  Results  for  eggs  and  milk,  cooking  oil,  and  sweets  were  not
significant in the 3SLS estimation  with respect to 0 and  02. Results  for miscellaneous  food expenditures  were not significant with respect to 02.
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